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Abstract
Negotiation is key to resolving conﬂicts, allocating re-
sources and establishing cooperation in systems of self-
interested agents. Often, an agent may have to select be-
tween different potential negotiation partners, and identi-
fying which offers the best chance of a successful negotia-
tion is a challenging task. However, poor selection of part-
ners can result in failure or in inefﬁcient outcomes. To that
end, this paper describes a motivation-based mechanism to
evaluate and select between negotiation candidates. This is
achieved by a twofold process: ﬁrst, acceptable candidates
are identiﬁed using motivation-based thresholds on objec-
tive scoring measures; second, the importance of issues is
considered, and expected performance measures are evalu-
ated accordingly. The mechanism is described and empiri-
cally evaluated.
1. Introduction
When entering a negotiation, the kinds of deals possi-
ble are affected by four main criteria: the negotiation pro-
tocol used; the strategies used by the participants; the avail-
able resources; and, the valuations placed on the resources
by the participants. Much existing work examines the in-
ﬂuences that protocols and strategies can have on negotia-
tion outcomes (e.g. [2, 3]), but there is less work that details
the effects of resource availability and valuation on the se-
lection of negotiation partners and, as a consequence, the
kinds of negotiation deals that are possible.
1.1. Partner Selection for Negotiation
Selecting a negotiation partner involves the considera-
tion of several issues against which candidates may be mea-
sured, comparing their relative performance and selecting
the best performing candidate. Exactly which issues are
considered depends largely on the particular negotiation
and the participants, with some common possibilities be-
ing price, quality, and the speed of delivery of the negotia-
tion object by the candidate.
When evaluating the performance of agents on particular
issues, it is common to use scoring functions, which offer a
way to relate the performance of different agents over dif-
ferent issues. However, agents must typically cope with en-
vironments that impose dynamic constraints on the satisfac-
tion of goals, which must be taken into account by the scor-
ing function. For example, an agent with a large amount of
money should score performance over an issue of price, say,
differently from an agent with little money. Such consider-
ations need a subjective approach in which the agent is able
to rate the performance of another agent based on its cur-
rent needs and constraints.
1.2. Motivation and Dynamic Constraints
One way to model the inﬂuence of agent attitudes and
dynamically changing constraints on selection criteria (typ-
ically triggered by environmental circumstances) is through
the use of motivation, which affects the choices and actions
of agents [6, 4, 1]. Motivations have an associated intensity
level, which is modiﬁed by the perception of motivationally
important features of the environment, called motivational
cues [5]. Motivations with higher intensities have greater in-
ﬂuence over an agent’s actions than those with lower inten-
sities.
2. Identiﬁcation of Candidates
Negotiation issues can typically be associated with a set
of possible values which, during the course of a negotiation,
may be assigned to the issue. Scoring the the expected per-
formance of candidate negotiation partners involves form-
ing expectations of the values a candidate will accept for a
given issue, and then evaluating that value. However, this
assumes that the issue will have a ﬁxed importance to the
agent so that the evaluation by the scoring function yields
the same score for the same expected performance at dif-
ferent times. However, this is unrealistic in many agent ap-
plications, where changing resource constraints may mean
that an issue may take on a greater or lesser level of impor-
tance over time.
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2.1. The Importance of Issues and Goals
In order to incorporate this issue of importance into the
evaluation of performance, we link motivations to issues so
that, as a motivation increases in intensity, then so does the
issue in importance. In turn, an issue’s importance deter-
mines an acceptability threshold, which limits those values
the issue might take to those that are seen as acceptable to
an agent.
Once we have the acceptability threshold set by the im-
portance of the issue, we then incorporate the importance
of the goal for which the negotiation has been set. Like is-
sues, goals are associated with motivations in themodel pre-
sented in [6], so that as a motivation’s intensity increases,
so does the importance of any goal that is associated with
it. The importance of the goal thus modiﬁes the acceptabil-
ity threshold, so that if the goal is highly important to the
agent the acceptability threshold is altered so that more val-
ues from the set of possible values the issue might take can
be considered acceptable.
3. Evaluation of Candidates
Once an agent has updated the acceptability thresholds
for each issue in the forthcoming negotiation, it can con-
sider the expected performance on those issues for each of
the possible negotiation candidates. In our work, we use an
historical approach in which past performance of candidates
on these issues is used to extrapolate future performance.At
this stage, the agent can discard those candidates whose ex-
pected performance does not pass the acceptability thresh-
olds. However, of the remaining set of candidates, the scores
of each are weighted using associated motivational intensi-
ties to determine which candidate has the best overall per-
formance given each issue’s relative importance to the agent
at that time.
4. Evaluating the Model
In order to evaluate the model we ran experiments to
check that the buyer was able to use information about po-
tential negotiation partners gained through past interactions.
We tested this by calculating which agent, out of a set of
available seller agents, offered the optimal deal given the
buyer’s current motivational state, and then comparing this
with the actual deal found by the buyer. Each run of the
experiment lasted for 200 negotiation rounds and we per-
formed 20 such runs with 100 candidate negotiation agents
and one buyer agent. Figure 1 shows the average variation
between the buyer-agent’s deal values and the optimal deal
values over the 20 experimental runs. It can be seen that
over time the buyer-agent eventually learns to exploit the
best seller-agents given its current motivational state, shown
by the variation line falling to 0 after negotiation number
150.
Figure 1. Performance of Motivated Partner
Selection
Though this analysis suggests that the model is effective,
much more work is needed to explore the full range of con-
cerns. Indeed, work is ongoing to examine the difference in
efﬁciency gains made by using motivational selection over
other selection processes.
5. Conclusion
By linking negotiation issues to motivations, agents
are able to evaluate prospective negotiation partner per-
formance over those issues in terms of current motiva-
tional needs, so that compatible partners can be iden-
tiﬁed. As an agent’s circumstances change, the issues
involved also change in importance, and this must be con-
sidered when attempting to choose which agents to
negotiate with. We expect future work to address the de-
velopment of methods for negotiation partner selection
where protocols and strategies are important decision fac-
tors.
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